In this article, Krawiec analyzes four monastic texts to argue that an attitude of “profamilialism” existed alongside the familiar view of antifamilialism. These ideologies are based on the link between spiritual and “fleshly” families in late antique Christianity. While Krawiec recognizes that ascetics largely rejected biological family bonds, she is interested in how spiritual communities – especially monasteries – negotiated biological families within their institutional contexts.
Krawiec begins by offering a background on the evolution of Roman notions of family in late antique Christianity. First, she notes that there is a significant amount of continuity; even “Christian” values like “requiring sexual fidelity from husbands” have Roman antecedents (284). Yet asceticism also contributed to change in family discourse, as Elizabeth Clark detailed in “Antifamilial Tendencies in Ancient Christianity.” As Krawiec sees it, the core of this shift is the divide between “fleshly families and spiritual communities” (285). Ascetics did not argue against the family per se, but they did emphasize the spiritual family over the biological; late antique Christianity was less “antifamilial” than it was “antiflesh.” In Krawiec’s words, ascetic Christianity absorbed “all that was valuable and transcendent about the family” and left the fleshly family “to wallow in its valueless corporeality” (285).
In this article, Krawiec nuances this thesis by examining the roles of biological families in the institutional context of monasticism. Krawiec argues that the inclusion of biological family members within the spiritual family of Christianity created rich, binding, eternal ties that were praised by even the most antifamilial ascetics. The first text Krawiec uses to illustrate this is Augustine’s letter to Laetus. Krawiec acknowledges that the letter appears to be a typical example of ascetic antifamiliasm. Like many ascetics, Augustine presents the biological family as a hurdle that must be overcome “in order to follow the higher devotion to God” (289). Yet Krawiec’s analysis demonstrates that Augustine fundamentally redefines rather than rejects the family. For instance, Augustine acknowledges that Laetus still has a duty to provide financially for his biological family. This shows that although Laetus’ loyalty is owed to his spiritual family, not all his biological relations can be rejected. More significant is how Augustine discusses Jesus’ relationship with his mother. In Krawiec’s reading, Augustine believes that Jesus can claim Mary as his mother not because she happened to give birth to him but because “she fits his definition of spiritual family relationships” (291). Mary does God’s will by not following the example of Eve but rather following God. This is why Jesus can claim Mary as his mother. On the other hand, Laetus must reject his mother. But the reason for this renunciation is not because of their biological relationship, but because Laetus’ mother chose Eve as her role model. A mother that follows the correct spiritual path can reaffirm her biological ties and create a spiritual family relationship; a mother that goes astray must be renounced.
Krawiec next turns to Augustine’s letter to Ecdicia. His advice to her is quite different from Augustine’s advice to Laetus. In fact, Augustine deems Ecdicia’s asceticism a sin because it led her husband into sin. Krawiec ascribes these different approaches to asceticism to the difference in familial obligations between a son and his mother and a wife and her husband. Each of these bonds is due to the model of Mary, even though the responsibilities entailed vary greatly. Augustine admonishes Ecdicia to follow Mary’s example in remaining submissive to her husband (Joseph) despite “no longer mixing in carnal intercourse [carnali consortio]” (293, quoting Augustine ep. 262.1). When Ecdicia adopts a principle of sexual abstinence – asceticism – she fails in her “specific role as a wife” (293). Augustine sees intercourse as a debt that spouses owe each other, even when one party chooses celibacy. This debt continues to have power, even within asceticism. As with Laetus, choosing to be an ascetic does not give one license to neglect financial obligations to family members – even when these financial obligations include one’s body.
As these letters indicate, ascetic vows and biological families could coexist – but only as long as “family members placed their spiritual relationship above their biological one” (295). Krawiec notes that Philip Rousseau found this same “transformation of familial bonds in the context of Egyptian communal monasticism” (295). Another prominent example of the coexistence of spiritual and fleshly bonds is the relationship between Gregory of Nyssa and his sister Macrina. Gregory’s theology “celebrates the materiality of the logos, the Word made flesh” (297, quoting Derek Krueger). Therefore, when Gregory writes a hagiography of Macrina he understands and prioritizes biological relationships. These include both Gregory’s own relationship to his sister and Macrina’s “noble exchange” (298, in Gregory’s words) with her mother. This fellowship (κοινωνίαν) is not opposed to spiritual devotion; rather, it transcends “nature” (φύσις) to support the worship of God. In all of Macrina’s relationships, the spiritual and the fleshly “work in tandem rather than opposition” (301).
Finally, Krawiec turns to the Egyptian monastic leader Shenoute. The sermon she analyzes is directed to both monks and laity, each with their own complex familial relationships. Krawiec argues that Shenoute’s “family discourse” is “remarkably consistent” (303). In both contexts, this discourse includes advocating “the correct use of corporal punishment” as part of “strong leadership” and the “proper definition” of different roles (304). Only by making these principles cornerstones of the family and of the monastic community will “true Christian sanctity” be achieved. If the Christian ideals are followed as Shenoute stipulates them, “the biological family can be as sacred as the monastic life itself, connecting all Christians rather than separating them” (305). What happens through Shenoute’s antifamilialism is not the abandonment of biological family but a discursive transformation that allows for the exploration and reconciliation of tensions within Christianity.
Throughout this article, Krawiec convincingly demonstrates that a profamilial attitude played a central role in ascetic familial discourse. Rather than abandoning the biological family, antifamilalism argues that the fleshly must be harmonized with the spiritual to “create a vision of a united Christian family” (306). In her conclusion, Krawiec gestures towards the power of this discourse. She argues that the integration of the fleshly family and the spiritual “family” creates a “myth of the ascetic’s ability to attain near perfection by living out the injunction of Luke 14.26”[1] (306). Within this myth, the biological family is not erased. Instead, the fleshly family’s “brief appearance helps to facilitate the working of the illusion” (306, quoting James Goehring). This is a powerful conclusion (although all too briefly treated) that relates the sources Krawiec treats at length to a convincing “master narrative” of antifamilialism.
[1] KJV: If any man come to me, and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple. NTG: εἴ τις ἔρχεται πρός με καὶ οὐ μισεῖ τὸν πατέρα ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τὴν μητέρα καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα καὶ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς καὶ τὰς ἀδελφὰς ἔτι τε καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἑαυτοῦ, οὐ δύναται εἶναί μου μαθητής.