Following in Bryer’s Footsteps From Kromni to Imera

The monastery of St John the Forerunner in Imera (Olucak), near Kromni (Kurum).

In 1962, the English historian Anthony Bryer set out to explore the district of Kromni, deep in the Pontus Mountains that rise spectacularly up from the Black Sea in the northeastern corner of Turkey. Bryer had gone looking for medieval churches from the Empire of Trebizond, but instead found “spectacular evidence of the prosperity of nineteenth-century Kromniots” (Bryer, The Post-Byzantine Monuments of Pontos, p. 268). Just who were these Kromniots, and what made them prosperous? Some called them “crypto-Christians”; indeed, this was how they had defined themselves in 1857, in a petition addressed to the Great Powers in the wake of the great reforms of the Tanzimat (as discussed thoroughly by Yorgos Tzedopoulos in his 2009 article “Public Secrets: Crypto-Christianity in the Pontos”). The Kromniots, or Kromlides, had an ambiguous identity and ambivalent social and legal status both in their own eyes and from the point of view of the Ottoman State. Something of this ambivalence is captured in “a gibe made by Turks at crypto-Christians who came to the Uzun SokaฤŸฤฑ in Trebizond to make an open profession of their faith in 1856” (Bryer, p. 268):

Uzun sokak รงamur oldu โ€”
Kromlilar Giaour oldu

Long Street has turned to mud โ€”
The Kromniots have turned Giaour.

Bryer tells us that this quote, which prefaces his section on the Kromni District, comes from the archives of the Centre for Micrasiatic Studies (sic), which is none other than the the ฮšฮญฮฝฯ„ฯฮฟ ฮœฮนฮบฯฮฑฯƒฮนฮฑฯ„ฮนฮบฯŽฮฝ ฮฃฯ€ฮฟฯ…ฮดฯŽฮฝ at which our group had also spent two weeks studying the oral history archives of Greek refugees who fled Asia Minor in the population exchange of 1923 before making our own journey to Trebizond.

Another visitor to Imera.

In this, as in many other respects, we found ourselves almost literally following in the footsteps of Bryer. His two monumental volumes โ€” the first published in 1985 with David Winfield, bearing the title The Byzantine Monuments of Pontos, and the second, aforementioned 2002 book with the title The Post-Byzantine Monuments of Pontos โ€” were our constant companions as we traipsed through the backcountry Bryer had traversed more than 40 years earlier. We marveled at how he had accessed ruined churches and abandoned villages that even today are still linked at best by winding dirt roads. We turned to his meticulous descriptions of seemingly every village church to try and puzzle out the dedications in cases where the frescoes of the dedicatory saints had long since eroded beyond any hope of legibility. We were lucky to have with us Professor Paschalis Kitromilides, who had himself accompanied Bryer on his travels many years before and now shared generously of his stories and knowledge. Once, we found ourselves so besotted with the sight of wildflowers in the meadow below the hillside monastery of Imera that we left Bryer’s little blue hardback on the ground as we ran together into the long grass. Back in our minibus, we searched frantically for the book until we concluded that Bryer had been left behind in our mad rush โ€” until the end of the day when the blue hardback reappeared as if by a miracle in the trunk. Lying in the meadow until a curious cow starts perusing its contents would have been a fate to make Bryer proud.

Traipsing through the meadow below Imera.

Above all, we found ourselves puzzling over the same phenomena and questions that Bryer himself wrote extensively about. Consider the foundation inscription of the church of Imera (image below). It says:

ฮŸฮ™ฮšฮŸฮ”ฮŸฮœฮ—ฮ˜ฮ— ฮŸ ฮ ฮ‘ฮฮฃฮ•ฮ ฮคฮŸฮฃ ฮŸฮฅฮคฮŸฮฃ ฮฮ‘ฮŸฮฃ ฮคฮŸฮฅ ฮ‘ฮ“ฮ™ฮŸฮฅ ฮ•ฮฮ”ฮŸ
ฮžฮŸฮฅ ฮ ฮก[ฮŸ]ฮฆฮ—[ฮคฮŸฮฅ] ฮ ฮก[ฮŸ]ฮ”[ฮกฮŸฮœฮŸฮฅ] ฮšฮ‘ฮ™ ฮ’[ฮ‘]ฮ ฮค[ฮ™]ฮฃ[ฮคฮŸฮฅ] ฮ™ฮฉฮ‘ฮฮฮŸฮฅ ฮคฮ—ฮฃ ฮœ[ฮŸ]ฮ[ฮ—]ฮฃ ฮ“ฮ—ฮœฮ•ฮกฮ‘ฮฃ
ฮ•ฮ ฮ™ ฮ’ฮ‘ฮฃ[ฮ™]ฮ›[ฮ™ฮŸฮฅ] ฮ‘ฮ ฮคฮŸฮฅฮ› ฮœฮ•ฮคฮ–ฮ™ฮค ฮšฮ‘ฮ™ ฮ•ฮ ฮ™ ฮคฮŸฮฅ ฮงฮ‘ฮ›ฮ”[ฮ™ฮ‘ฮฃ] ฮ˜ฮ•ฮŸฮฆฮ™[ฮ›ฮŸฮฅ]
ฮ”ฮ™ฮ‘ ฮฃฮฅฮฮ”ฮก[ฮŸ]ฮœ[ฮ—]ฮฃ ฮคฮ—ฮฃ ฮš[ฮฅฮกฮ™ฮ‘ฮฃ] ฮšฮ‘ฮ˜ฮ—ฮ“ฮŸฮฅฮœฮ•ฮฮ—ฮฃ ฮกฮฉฮžฮ‘ฮฮ—ฮฃ ฮกฮ‘ฮคฮ 
ฮšฮ‘ฮ™ ฮฃฮฅฮ ฮ’ฮŸฮ—ฮ˜ฮ—ฮ‘ ฮคฮฉฮ ฮ•ฮฅฮฃฮ•ฮ’ฮฉฮ ฮšฮ‘ฮ™ ฮŸฮกฮ˜ฮŸฮ”ฮŸฮžฮฉฮ
ฮงฮกฮ™ฮฃฮคฮ™ฮ‘ฮฮฉฮ ฮ‘ฮœฮ—ฮ ฮŸ ฮ ฮกฮฉฮคฮŸ ฮœฮ‘ฮชฮฃฮคฮฉฮกฮ‘ฮฃ ฮ“ฮกฮ—ฮ“ฮŸฮกฮ™ฮฃ ฮงฮกฮฅฮฃฮŸฮฅฮ›ฮ™ฮ”ฮ—ฮฃ ฮœฮ‘ฮชฮŸฮฅ 1 ฮ•ฮคฮŸฮฃ 1859

This holy church of the Saint and Prophet the Forerunner and Baptist John of the Monastery of Imera was built under the reign of Sultan [Vasiliou] Abdul Mecit and under [Bishop] Theophilus of Chaldia by the contribution of the Abbess Roxana Ratp [sic] and with the assistance of the pious Orthodox Christians amen the first builder Gregoris Chrisoulidis May 1 in the year 1859 [my own loose translation]
The foundation inscription at the church of Imera.

Here, too, we turned to Bryer to help us puzzle out the text of this inscription which he says is “confident in style, if not epigraphy” (Bryer, p. 298). But what Bryer could only begin to tell us about is the social and political identity and context of the people who built this place. Who is the “Roxana” who served as an abbess in refounding this monastery? What did the Kromniots of Imera think of Abdul Mecit, the sultan of the Tanzimat? Were they merely paying their dues or did they actually feel a sense of open possibility in the post-Tanzimat Ottoman Empire? How did their relationship to the Ottoman Sultan interweave with their identity as “devout Orthodox Christians”? How, if at all, did they identify as “Greeks” โ€” whether Hellenes, Romioi, or Pontians?

One of our seminar participants talking with a man who was tending his cows as they grazed near Imera.

These are substantial and serious questions that go beyond the confines of a short blog post such as this. In the end, I think they also push us beyond Bryer, because they take us into the realms of Ottoman and twentieth-century history (and social and political theory) that exceed the competences of this Oxford-trained Byzantinist. Yet we can begin to provide an answer to these questions by returning to the same evidence that Bryer so thoroughly documented for us: the primary literary sources, the people who made their lives in these places (whether we can talk to them today or whether we hear their voices through archives like that at the Centre for Asia Minor Studies), and above all from the material remains of the sites themselves. Suffice it to say, then, that from Plaka to Kromni, from Athens to Trebizond, and from religion to economy, we continue to follow in Bryer’s footsteps.

Moral Action and Religious Ends in Kant

In what sense are ends necessary for action, for Kant? This question might seem rather far from the problem of religion. Yet this is precisely how Kant presents his Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, in his preface to the first edition. On the one hand, as Kant showed in the Critique of Practical Reason, morality โ€œis in need neither of the idea of another being above him in order that he recognize his duty, nor, that he observe it, of an incentive other than the law itselfโ€ (33; 6:3). Morality proceeds from rationality, not from divine authority. In this line of thought, we might draw a connection between Kant and, for instance, Nietzsche: good and bad are based not on divine legislation but ultimately on human beings. โ€œHence,โ€ Kant continues, โ€œon its own behalf morality in no way needs religion โ€ฆ but is rather self-sufficient by virtue of pure practical reasonโ€ (33; 6:3): moral laws bind โ€œthrough the mere form of universal lawfulness,โ€ not an end to which it is directed.

But โ€œalthough on its own behalf morality does not need the representation of an end which would have to precede the determination of the will, it may well be that it has a necessary reference to such an end, not as the ground of its maxims but as a necessary consequence accepted in conformity to themโ€ (34; 6:4). Although morality has โ€œno need of an end for right conduct โ€ฆ an end proceeds from morality just the same; for it cannot possibly be a matter of indifference to reason how to answer the question, What is then the result of this right conduct of ours?โ€ (34; 6:5). In a way, this argument parallels the place of God and Kantโ€™s development of religious thought with respect to his critical thought: religion is in no way necessary for rational critique โ€” in fact, the Critiques in some ways leave no place for God at all โ€” but after all is said and done, after โ€œclearing a ground completely overgrownโ€ for metaphysics, Kant still find that he must turn to religion, at the end of his life. In this contemplation, Kant finds โ€œthe idea of a highest good in the worldโ€: the summum bonum โ€œfor whose possibility we must assume a higher, moral, most holy, and omnipotent being who alone can unite the two elements of this goodโ€ (that is, happiness and duty).

So, this begins to answer our question. Do moral actions have an end? Not quite; pure practical reason suffices unto itself. God is not necessary as a legislator, yet God does have a place as the ultimate end of moral action. โ€œWhat is most important here, however, is that this idea rises out of morality and is not its foundation; that it is an end which to make oneโ€™s own already presupposes ethical principles.โ€ An end is not necessary for morality, but action and do come to the concept of an ultimate end of things. โ€œMorality thus inevitably leads to religionโ€ (35; 6:6). Moral actions are self-grounded, with no need for a separate further end. But the idea of God is an end to which we are inevitable led as human beings who honor the moral law, and allow themselves to think (35; 6:5).

Now, this insight is more useful than it might seem, especially when we come back to an essay like the โ€œIdea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim.โ€ In a way, this essay distills some of the most knotty and debated elements of Kantโ€™s thought: his changing thoughts on teleology, practical faith, divine providence, and how that whole complex of ideas relates to moral and political philosophy. This is because the essay is concerned in many ways with the same question that Kant addresses in the beginning of Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason: the relationship between free action and a final end. Kant says: โ€œWhatever concept one may form of the freedom of the will with a metaphysical aim, its appearances, the human actions, are determined just as much as every other natural occurrence in accordance with universal laws of natureโ€ (108; 8:17). It seems that Kant will then proceed to make an argument that an apparent end presents itself even in the โ€œplay of the freedom of the human willโ€ such that โ€œwhat meets the eye in individual subjects as confused and irregular yet in the whole species can be recognized as a steadily progressing though slow development of its original predispositions.โ€ But Kantโ€™s ultimate attitude towards this โ€œidea of progressโ€ is rather more complex and nuanced. For instance, Kant couches the adoption of this concept in starkly emotional, subjective language:

One cannot resist feeling a certain indignation when one sees their [human beingsโ€™ โ€” as opposed to animals or aliens] doings and refrainings on the great stage of the world and finds that despite the wisdom appearing now and then in individual cases, everything in the large is woven together out of folly, childish vanity, often also out of childish malice and the rage to destruction; so that in the end one does not know what concept to make of our species, with its smug imaginings about its excellences. Here there is no other way out for the philosopher โ€” who, regarding human beings and their play in the large, cannot at all presuppose any rational aim of theirs โ€” than to try whether he can discover an aim of nature in this nonsensical course of things human; from which aim a history in accordance with a determinate plan of nature might nevertheless be possible even of creatures who do not behave in accordance with their own plan. (109; 8:18)

Kant from the beginning to the end of this essay recognizes that there is no progress, no real rational aim in the โ€œnonsensical course of things human.โ€ But that does not mean it is pointless to try and write a history in accordance with a plan โ€” much like how it is not pointless to try and philosophize about God, even when one has fully laid out a system of morality in which God has no place.

Why? This is the subject of the ninth proposition of the โ€œIdeaโ€ essay: โ€œA philosophical attempt to work out universal world history according to a plan of nature that aims at the perfect civil union of the human species, must be regarded as possible and even as furthering this aim of natureโ€ (118; 8:29). On the one hand, it is absurd to want to write a history of progress; โ€œit appears that with such an aim only a novel could be brought about.โ€ Yet โ€œif, nevertheless, one may assume that nature does not proceed without a plan or final aim even in the play of human freedom, then this idea could become useful.โ€ An idea that is useful? Yes, it seems like Kantโ€™s ultimate justification for conceiving an idea of the end, here as in the Religion text, is that such an idea would be useful to progress in the present. The โ€œguiding threadโ€ of progress โ€œcan serve not merely for the explanation of such a confused play of things human, or for an art of political soothsaying about future changes in statesโ€; rather, this idea of progress will open โ€œa consoling prospect into the future (which without a plan of nature one cannot hope for with any ground).โ€ This is the ultimate motivation for adopting an idea of progress: โ€œsuch a justification of nature โ€” or better, of providence โ€” is no unimportant motive for choosing a particular viewpoint for considering the worldโ€ (119; 8:30). Although we could write history without progress, and we could develop morality without God, we have strong practical grounds for choosing viewpoints that contain precisely these ideas. To me, it is striking to find a sort of primacy of the practical at the heart of Kantโ€™s philosophy. Kant is almost like a nihilist, who sees a world where, in fact, there is no God, no progress; yet he shies back from the abyss of meaninglessness, not through the construction of a new dogmatic metaphysics (Kant is too resolutely critical for that), but rather through the recognition that our representation of the past, like our prospects for the future, matter most of all for our actions in the present.

Reading Asad Reading Wittgenstein

I donโ€™t think itโ€™s an accident that Wittgenstein and Cavell both grew up in intensely musical environments. Brahms frequented the Wittgenstein household, and his brother Paul was the dedicatee of Ravelโ€™s Piano Concerto for the Left Hand (because he had lost his right arm in the First World War); Cavellโ€™s mother was also intensely musical, and he studied composition at Juilliard before switching to philosophy at UCLA. Playing the piano is reading and not-reading at once. As Asad puts it:

When a practiced pianist plays, thoughtfully and with feeling, a piece of music she has mastered without having to read the score, one can say that signs have dissolved into her hands. To say that is not to imply that the activity is meaningless but that it is the result of practice that has eventuated in an ability to act in a particular way. (404)

Sometimes, when I play piano, my thoughts drift. This is not to say that my playing is mechanical, as if I could separate my bodyโ€™s machine-like movements from my higher faculty of thinking. As Asad says, it is quite the opposite: my habit of playing allows me to inhabit a form of life and so take grammatical rules to be perfectly ordinary. It is as if I am a native speaker who has mastered that languageโ€™s grammar without knowing what rules I am in fact following.

In this opening passage we see the two questions that I think preoccupy Asad in his turn to Wittgenstein. First: what to do with signs and symbols, or how to make sense of culture after Geertz. Second: what to do with the category of โ€œreligion,โ€ or how to make sense of religious practice after genealogy (in Foucaultโ€™s sense). We can find resources to address these queries in Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein had as his primary object of inquiry meaning, i.e. representation/signification/ostension; he carried out his inquiry through grammatical investigations of e.g. pain, language-games, and rule-following. Asad is a significant anthropologist of religion, and specifically of โ€œformations of the secularโ€ like pain and agency; but I see an overarching concern in his work for rethinking meaning, representation, and agency. In my view, where they meet is in that they both locate agency in use (of, e.g., descriptions or pain) rather than in representation.

One way into these questions might be to look again at โ€œpractice.โ€ I donโ€™t usually think of practicing the piano as something like the religious practices anthropologists sometimes claim to study. But they bear deep similarities, after all: children are forced to practice piano and to practice making the sign of the cross in church โ€” both ways of enforcing discipline, of shaping habit, of learning to follow rules. In other words, practice is a central way of inculcating a form of life. One might think there is something of value in โ€œunmaskingโ€ the origin of these practices โ€” for instance, in pointing to the role of religion in reinforcing power dynamics, rather than being a โ€œtrueโ€ expression of โ€œfaith.โ€ In Foucaultโ€™s terms, this would be a genealogy. In Wittgensteinโ€™s, it is a rather different matter. As Asad puts it:

My point is simply that he [Wittgenstein] not only helps us see that looking for meanings underneath signs (whether in the form of writing, voice, or gesture) is mistaken because meanings are embodied in practice. He also makes us aware that to the extent that a form of life has been mastered through practiceโ€”once the practice becomes part of the everyday, of an ordinary form of lifeโ€”explicit signs may become unnecessary. (404)

To show that a given practice is part of an ordinary form of life is exactly that: ordinary. Saying that, e.g., โ€œreligionโ€ is a category that must be located within the history of Christianity isnโ€™t to radically unsettle a theory of the world, but rather to show how the meaning of โ€œreligionโ€ is constituted by its everyday use.

Thus, for Wittgenstein (in Asadโ€™s words), โ€œreligious practice isnโ€™t necessarily based on a theory about the world; it is first and foremost a way of beingโ€ (405). Wittgensteinโ€™s critique of Frazer was that he illegitimately confused these two interpretations of religion. As Asad puts it, Wittgenstein โ€œfinds particularly objectionable Frazerโ€™s extension of judgments of truth or falsity, of sense or nonsense, from propositions where such judgments are appropriate to situations where they are notโ€ (405). Asad astutely notes that this parallels, in a way, Malinowskiโ€™s own proposition that myths are not โ€œchildish accounts of the past but narratives that functioned as justiยญfiยญcations of social claims and institutions in the presentโ€ (405). But Asad also cautions us not to conflate this reorientation with Wittgensteinโ€™s turn from meaning to use: โ€œthe latter doesnโ€™t simply argue that meaning is necessarily determined by use (thus generalizing Malinowskiโ€™s interpretation of the meaning of myth), but that the multiple ways in which language is usedโ€”by sender and by receiverโ€”require us to investigate the complex relationships of discourse to life through the idea of โ€˜grammarโ€™โ€ (406). It is worth thinking in just what way Wittgenstein differs from Malinowski, that is in what way the โ€œcomplex relationships of discourse to lifeโ€ are not reducible to โ€œculture.โ€ I would propose that this gap hinges on our understanding of โ€œuseโ€ not primarily as a noun but as a verb: we use descriptions as instruments, not because we are justified in doing so but because we have a right (PI ยง289, ยง291).

Note again that this is not using descriptions for the purpose of, say, advancing critique (as Horkheimer thinks โ€œtraditional theoryโ€ can be put to critical uses). Instead, Asad says: โ€œIf language is rooted in ways of being and doing, description is not merely necessary to critique; it may be critiqueโ€ (409). Then, we might think the prime example of critique is the re-description of a form of life โ€œin another way than the one generally familiar to usโ€ (410), with the purpose of changing behavior. In other words, โ€œcriticism is an activity rooted in and directed at what binds people to their forms of life, not simply an expression of โ€˜rational argumentโ€™โ€ (410).

To begin again, in a different key: I do not think it is an accident that my feelings when I heard Grigory Sokolov play in the Concertgebouw in June were religious. Once again, my thoughts drifted away, but not quite to be replaced with feeling. To play the piano well, Asad tells us, is to play with both thought and feeling. Thus Augustine, in his Confessions, is both the literary writer of great feeling and the Neoplatonic philosopher of great thought. Showing that one is reducible to the other brings us nowhere โ€” and is untrue, besides. Augustine did not give up his philosophy when he became a Christian, even if its trappings fell away; a great pianist does not give up caring about scores when they master a piece of music (quite the opposite; the great interpreters of Bach will often make their own editions from his manuscripts). Signs do not dissolve into thin air. Rather, they โ€œdissolve into hands.โ€ Representation is redirected to embodied agency, our โ€œability to act in a particular wayโ€ (404).


Bibliography

Asad, Talal. Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity. Cultural Memory in the Present. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2003.

โ€”โ€”โ€”. Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993.

โ€”โ€”โ€”. โ€œThinking about Religion through Wittgenstein.โ€ Critical Times 3, no. 3 (December 1, 2020): 403โ€“42. https://doi.org/10.1215/26410478-8662304

Cavell, Stanley. Little Did I Know: Excerpts from Memory. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010.

Monk, Ray. Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius. New York: Free Press, 1990.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1968.

Notes on Talal Asad and Clifford Geertz on the Study of Religion

A longer paper that grew out of this essay can be found here.

What might be an appropriate and useful way to talk about something like โ€œreligionโ€ across times, locales, and disciplines? This is a question shared by classical approaches to the study of religion like those of Max Weber, ร‰mile Durkheim, and Max Mรผller, and more recent scholars like Clifford Geertz, Talal Asad, Tomoko Masuzawa, and Jonathan Z. Smith. What Smith, Asad, Geertz, and Masuzawa share in common is a sense of the inadequacy of the classical approaches. Asad, Smith, and Masuzawa in particular offer as alternatives paying more attention to reflexivity, disciplinary history, and the relation between power and knowledge. In this post, I want to offer some comments and a question based primarily on Asadโ€™s chapter “The Construction of Religion as an Anthropological Category” in his seminal book Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).

Continue reading “Notes on Talal Asad and Clifford Geertz on the Study of Religion”