In the text The Philosopher’s Way of Life, Al-Razi articulates his view of the philosophical life as a way of moderation between the two extremes of hedonism and asceticism. In this essay, I briefly describe some of the key characteristics of this philosophical life, mention some aspects that are not part of this way of life, and outline the reasons Al-Razi gives in defense of his conception. I conclude by briefly assessing Al-Razi’s argument.
For Al-Razi, the life of philosophy can be found in the “model of our leader Socrates” (p. 36). Some aspects of Socrates’ life are that of an ascetic. For instance, Socrates lives in a barrel and eats only “dry herbage” (p. 37, l. 4). From our perspective, it seems that these stories conflate sources describing the life of Diogenes the Cynic with traditions of Islamic mysticism. Yet Al-Razi does not dispute the veracity of these stories. Instead, his problem with the depictions of Socrates as an ascetic is that “they ignore many other things about him” (p. 37, l. 15) because “people love to spread the rare and odd report and avoid the mundane and customary ones” (p. 37, l. 36).
For Al-Razi, what is significant is that Socrates’ behavior is “the result of his strong fascination with and love for philosophy” (p. 37, l. 23). This is why Socrates’ life should be taken as a model for the philosopher. In addition to the model of Socrates, Al-Razi provides two more foundations for his project. The first consists in the principles he elucidated in other books on medicine. The second source is the monotheistic conception of the Last Judgement, which leads us to do things in the present that will lead to “our liberation from this world in the world in which there is neither pain nor death [i.e., the afterlife]” (p. 38, l. 35).
So, what are the key characteristics of the philosophical life which emerge from these foundations? First, “we must not harm any sentient creature” unless doing so would “avert a greater harm” (p. 40, l. 4). Al-Razi proceeds to illustrate this principle with examples of consequentialist reasoning — for instance, that if two men were to die of thirst, he who would be of the most benefit to society is he who should be saved. More generally, Al-Razi seems quite concerned for the welfare of animals, even endorsing vegetarianism, which also follows Socrates’ example. Another corollary of this principle is that people should not harm themselves. An extreme example of this is the Hindu practice of sati, or self-immolation, which Al-Razi is quick to condemn.
But Al-Razi is concerned more generally with all forms of religious ascetism. He thinks, for instance, that monasticism is incompatible with the philosophical way of life. Al-Razi writes that such “withdrawal from the world” amounts to “a form of self-oppression and self-harm that does not help one avoid a more preferable pain” (p. 41, l. 15). Socrates, it is true, followed just such a path of asceticism in his youth.[2] Yet ultimately, according to Al-Razi, Socrates found moderation and avoided the excesses of asceticism he had practiced in his youth. As philosophers, we too should avoid the temptation of extreme asceticism.
Ultimately, the philosophical way of life lies in moderation. The philosopher must avoid both the excesses of pleasure and the “futile form of self-harm” (p. 42, l. 22) that asceticism represents. In both cases, he who exceeds the limits provokes “divine displeasure” and risks “losing the title of the philosopher” (p. 42, l. 22–3). Conversely, he who is most learned, just, compassionate, and merciful is he who is closest to God. Al-Razi interprets this philosophical way of living close to God as a path of moderation. This is what he finds in Socrates, too: a model of the wise man who can judge where the right balance lies between hedonism and asceticism.
I find Al-Razi’s approach to the philosophical way of life a breath of fresh air. I expect medieval thinkers to lean more towards the side of asceticism; perhaps it’s a stereotype, but I thought that monasticism was very close to the practice of philosophy at this time. I think Al-Razi is right to stress that we ought to avoid not just the extremes of excess (the traditional vices, e.g. gluttony, lust, greed) but also their opposite extremes (abstinence from food, celibacy, frugality). Perhaps this is too much of a stretch, but I see some proleptic echoes of Spinoza, whose whole Ethics is premised on the power of the mind to moderate the passions — not to overcome them, but rather to find the sort of happy medium that Al-Razi also advocates.