In this paper, Rosenwein argues for a history of emotions based on “emotional communities.” She begins by surveying the scientific literature on emotions to discuss their supposed universality. She then elaborates on her methodology, mentioning some issues and benefits of centering emotional communities before concluding with some thoughts towards the future of the history of emotions.
Rosenwein states that most psychologists follow Paul Ekman in the theory “that particular facial behaviors are universally associated with particular emotions” (2, quoting Ekman). In fact, the inability to identify emotions with the facial expressions that Ekman specifies is often seen as a sign of mental illness. Biologists and geneticists also work within this framework when carrying out their research. Rosenwein identifies the underlying assumptions of this kind of scientific research as presentism and universalism. She notes that evolutionary psychology has the potential to challenge the presentist view, but does not do so. Rosenwein cites two leading theorists of this field, Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, who conclude that “our modern skulls house a stone age mind” (5) – fossilized emotions and all.
On the other hand, Rosenwein also discusses scholars who challenge the “scientific” view of emotions, often by asserting some form of social constructionism. For example, anthropologists have criticized Ekman for neglecting the role of language and translation when testing “universal” emotions and facial expressions. As for the evolutionists, other scholars have pointed out that we know very little about the Paleolithic – when emotions are said to have “fossilized” – and the little we do know is deeply influenced by our own time. Furthermore, neurobiologists have demonstrated a remarkable amount of plasticity in the brain, not to mention the importance of epigenetics. These factors indicate that change in emotional pathways can be much more rapid than genetic evolution would suggest. This view supports the theory of social constructionism – briefly, that emotions “are shaped by the societies in which they are embedded” (9).
Rosenwein laments that even social constructionists, however, neglect the history of emotions. In order to counter both universalist and presentist trends, Rosenwein stresses that a history of emotions “must not deny the biological substratum of emotions” but must also “problematize the feelings of the past, addressing their distinctive characteristics” (10). At this juncture, she introduces the concept of “emotional communities.” These are “largely the same as social communities” but with a heavy emphasis on “systems of feeling” (11).
Next, Rosenwein offers some practical methodological advice to the emotional historian. First is to gather sources for each community, preferably with multiple voices that all converge on some kinds of norms. The next step is to problematize the words used to describe emotions. This includes questioning the equation of modern and historical emotions, but also wondering whether the terms used in historical contexts were under the rubric of “emotions” at all. A good way to do this is to consult contemporaneous theorists of emotions – although not every formal definition should be taken at face value. Indeed, ideally the weight and significance of all terms should be interrogated. The methods of doing this include qualitative surveys and quantitative tools such as word counts. But these methods run the risk of omitting a key form of evidence: silence. Some kinds of “unemotional” texts reveal a clear norm that represses expression of some emotions. Metaphors and ironies can be similarly revealing, though also difficult to parse.
In sum, these steps lead the historian to consider emotions as “above all instruments of sociability” (19). Emotions are means of communication, especially when following certain scripts and hegemonic norms. Some historians, understanding this function of emotions, question whether they are “sincere.” Rosenwein stresses that emotions can play many roles; authenticity is just one of these, and it should be studied only if it is important to the society in question. In short, Rosenwein prioritizes the social function of emotions above all. Finally, Rosenwein reminds historians that they must “trace changes over time” (21): they must remember that norms and societies are never static. Rosenwein is interested in investigating the turning points in the history of emotions and connecting the emergence and transformation of emotional norms to the dominance of certain emotional communities.
Rosenwein ends by looking ahead to a time when the study of emotions will “inform every historical inquiry,” when “the problems and methods of the history of emotions should become the property of history in general” (24). This paper is an excellent counterpart to “Worrying about Emotions in History.” There, Rosenwein surveys the perspectives of historians on emotions; here, she surveys the perspectives of scientists. In both cases, she ends by advocating her own theory centered on emotional communities. In this article, Rosenwein lays out clear, useful methodological strategies for the historian to apply. Although probably not perfect, the steps she outlines should be the starting point for any future history of emotions and should be considered in any historiography.